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Abstract: The error management model of altruism in one-shot interactions provides8
an influential explanation for one of the most controversial behaviors in evolutionary9
social science. The model posits that one-shot altruism arises from a domain-specific10
cognitive bias that avoids the error of mistaking a long-term relationship for a one-shot11
interaction. One-shot altruism is thus, in an intriguingly paradoxical way, a form of reci-12
procity. We examine the logic behind this idea in detail. In its most general form the13
error management model is exceedingly flexible, and restrictions about the psychology14
of agents are necessary for selection to be well-defined. Once these restrictions are in15
place, selection is well defined, but it leads to behavior that is perfectly consistent with16
an unbiased rational benchmark. Thus, the evolution of one-shot reciprocity does not re-17
quire an evoked cognitive bias based on repeated interactions and reputation. Moreover,18
in spite of its flexibility in terms of psychology, the error management model assumes19
that behavior is exceedingly rigid when individuals face a new interaction partner. Reci-20
procity can only take the form of tit-for-tat, and individuals cannot adjust their behavior21
in response to new information about the duration of a relationship. Ze↵erman (2014)22
showed that one-shot reciprocity does not reliably evolve if one relaxes the first restric-23
tion, and we show that the behavior does not reliably evolve if one relaxes the second24
restriction. Altogether, these theoretical results on one-shot reciprocity do not square25
well with experiments showing increased altruism in the presence of payo↵-irrelevant26
stimuli that suggest others are watching.27
Key words: cognitive biases, error management theory, evolution of cooperation,28
anonymous one-shot games29
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1 Introduction30
Error management theory (Haselton and Nettle, 2006) has provided a number of provoca-31
tive hypotheses about the evolution of human behaviors in di↵erent domains. Error32
management mechanisms all share the assumption that asymmetric error costs in the33
ancestral past drove the genetic evolution of domain-specific mechanisms responsible for34
strong biases in behavior. These behavioral biases often persist and can thus be ob-35
served among contemporary humans. To recount perhaps the most well-known example36
(Haselton and Buss, 2000; Haselton and Nettle, 2006; Perriloux and Kurzban, 2015),37
consider a man in a bar. The man is curious about whether various women in the bar38
might have sex with him. The man can make two types of error. He can approach a39
woman who rejects him, or he can fail to approach a woman who would have responded40
positively had he approached her. The hypothesis proposes that for men, for most of41
human evolutionary history, missed mating opportunities were more costly than rejec-42
tions. Because of this selective regime in the ancestral past, our representative man in43
a bar will show a strong tendency to approach women for sex. Though the details vary44
by decision-making domain, other error management hypotheses follow the same basic45
logic.46
In general, one of the challenges in error management theory is determining whether47
a given bias in behavior involves an associated cognitive bias (McKay and E↵erson,48
2010; Marshall et al., 2013). If decision makers face asymmetric error costs and maxi-49
mize expected utility or fitness, decision makers will exhibit behavioral biases even with50
Bayesian beliefs. The man in the bar, for example, might overestimate the woman’s51
interest in him relative to what the evidence suggests, but this is not necessary. If the52
cost asymmetry is su ciently extreme, he will approach the woman even if he has an53
exceedingly weak belief that he will be successful. Moreover, this is true even if he54
has integrated all relevant information in an unbiased and theoretically justifiable way,55
which means he has posterior beliefs equivalent to a Bayesian. The upshot is that bi-56
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ases in behavior under cost asymmetries may often be perfectly consistent with ordinary57
optimization and unbiased beliefs. Error management accounts, in contrast, emphasize58
the hypothesis that asymmetric error costs in a given domain in the ancestral past have59
generated adaptive domain-specific cognitive biases (Haselton and Nettle, 2006; Johnson60
et al., 2013). Because error management often predicts the same behavior, for example,61
as maximizing expected utility under Bayesian beliefs, identifying e↵ects specifically due62
to biased cognition can be di cult (McKay and E↵erson, 2010; Marshall et al., 2013).63
These challenges are especially relevant for the error management account of anony-64
mous one-shot altruism. Anonymous one-shot altruism has been documented experi-65
mentally many times (Camerer, 2003), but providing an evolutionary explanation has66
proven to be a caustic and controversy-filled area of research (Henrich, 2004; Raihani67
and Bshary, 2015). One highly influential hypothesis argues that subjects who are al-68
truistic in one-shot experiments are managing errors. Specifically, they are somehow69
treating the one-shot interaction as repeated because repeated interactions were a cru-70
cial part of social life for ancestral humans. As a result, humans have evolved cognitive71
biases that are extremely sensitive to signals suggesting one’s prosocial reputation might72
be at stake. After observing such a signal, the relevant psychology can become active,73
and individuals behave prosocially in order to protect their reputations in implicitly74
repeated interactions (Haley and Fessler, 2005; Hagen and Hammerstein, 2006; Burn-75
ham, 2013; Raihani and Bshary, 2015, but see Ze↵erman, 2014). Anonymous one-shot76
altruism in this case is more appropriately thought of as one-shot reciprocity. Though77
the explicit structure of the social interaction is anonymous and one-shot, the implicit78
structure hinges on an evoked psychology involving repeated interactions, reciprocity,79
and reputation management.80
Empirical studies of one-shot reciprocity have largely tested whether altruistic giv-81
ing increases in the presence of payo↵-irrelevant signals suggesting the subject is being82
observed. A typical signal, for example, is some kind of stylized face that appears in the83
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background without explanation. Studies of this sort have produced a fascinating mix84
of findings both for and against the one-shot reciprocity hypothesis (Nettle et al., 2013;85
Sparks and Barclay, 2013), and we even have conflicting results from studies using ex-86
actly the same stylized face and similar experimental protocols (Haley and Fessler, 2005;87
Fehr and Schneider, 2010; Vogt et al., 2015). Given recent studies showing that exper-88
imental results on social behavior do not replicate as often as we might like (Shanks89
et al., 2013; Open-Science-Collaboration, 2015; Camerer et al., 2016), we should ap-90
proach mixed empirical results with some skepticism, and future experimental research91
on one-shot reciprocity would benefit greatly from pre-registration. Furthermore, even92
if results supporting one-shot reciprocity prove reliable in the long run, the appropriate93
evolutionary interpretation is far from obvious (Vogt et al., 2015).94
Nonetheless, the fact remains that several experiments have found that payo↵-irrelevant95
cues increase altruism, and the interpretation that reciprocity and reputation a↵ect one-96
shot behavior has been extremely influential (Haley and Fessler, 2005; Hagen and Ham-97
merstein, 2006; Raihani and Bshary, 2015). Understanding the evolution of psychological98
mechanisms that might support one-shot reciprocity is our objective in this paper. In99
particular, when payo↵-irrelevant cues increase altruism, payo↵-irrelevance and the min-100
imal nature of the stimuli (e.g. Rigdon et al., 2009) suggest that a cognitive bias could be101
at work. A recent evolutionary model has provided a theoretical foundation for this idea102
by demonstrating how past cost asymmetries could have selected for a psychology that103
supports one-shot reciprocity (Delton et al., 2011a). The model assumes that agents104
are uncertain about whether social interactions are one-shot or repeated. Agents receive105
cues that provide information about this critical distinction, and they then commit to a106
strategy. Agents can thus make two types of error. They can treat a one-shot interaction107
as repeated, or they can treat repeated interactions as one-shot. When agents are play-108
ing a social dilemma with potential e ciency gains, the latter error can be much more109
costly. This cost asymmetry can lead to the evolution of a cognitively biased tendency110
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to cooperate “irrationally” (Delton et al., 2011a, p. 13336) in one-shot interactions.111
The link to experiments showing that payo↵-irrelevant cues can increase altruism112
is the following. In ancestral settings, cues of observability were conceivably impor-113
tant sources of information indicating repeated interactions and the need to manage114
one’s reputation. The error management model of one-shot reciprocity shows that un-115
der appropriate conditions selection can render agents extremely sensitive to such cues.116
Specifically, a population can evolve so that agents behave prosocially even if available117
cues provide only weak evidence that interactions are repeated. This hypersensitivity is118
what the contemporary experimentalist identifies when she finds that a stylized face, for119
example, increases altruism in a setting that is otherwise described as one-shot. Exper-120
imental participants may or may not be aware of how they respond to a stylized face.121
Regardless, the error management account argues that ancestral cost asymmetries led122
to a cognitive bias exceedingly prone to yield altruistic behavior even when observable123
cues only weakly signal that one’s prosocial reputation is at stake.124
The error management model of one-shot reciprocity raises two fundamental ques-125
tions, and we take up both in this paper. First, does one-shot reciprocity actually require126
a cognitive bias? As we have argued, cost asymmetries can generate tremendous biases127
in behavior without cognitive distortions. To identify a cognitive bias, one must have128
an unbiased benchmark. We provide exactly such a benchmark below and compare it129
to the error management model of one-shot reciprocity.130
Second, regardless of the cognitive underpinnings, how robust is the evolution of one-131
shot reciprocity as a behavior? A growing body of theory has shown that the evolution132
of reciprocal strategies can be quite fragile (Boyd and Lorberbaum, 1987; Wahl and133
Nowak, 1999; Boyd, 2006; Le and Boyd, 2007; van Veelen et al., 2012; Ze↵erman, 2014).134
In particular, repeated interactions create many equilibria. As a result, a population can135
evolve such that any given reciprocal strategy, once common, will collapse and open the136
door for some other reciprocal strategy to invade. Reciprocal strategies come and go, and137
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the population spends a conspicuous amount of time at the uncooperative equilibrium138
along the way (van Veelen et al., 2012). Without assortment, preventing this outcome139
usually requires one to arbitrarily exclude certain strategies from consideration, and this140
leads to model results that seem equivalently arbitrary (Henrich, 2004).141
Importantly, if these problems exist when interactions are actually repeated, they142
could also exist for the implicitly repeated interactions of one-shot reciprocity. Ze↵erman143
(2014) has recently shown that this is indeed the case. We come to the same conclusion144
in a di↵erent way. Specifically, Ze↵erman (2014) allowed for various forms of reciprocity145
that are hesitant, repentant, and forgiving. We simply allow agents to update how146
they play as they receive new information about whether a relationship is one-shot or147
repeated. Intuitively, if error management agents choose defection or reciprocity given148
beliefs in the face of uncertainty (Delton et al., 2011a), we allow them to update their149
choice when uncertainty is removed. This is a minute and compelling modification of the150
error management model because it represents a simple extension of the logic inherent151
in the model itself.152
Throughout the paper we show in detail how our approach relates to both Delton153
et al. (2011a) and Ze↵erman (2014). As a brief prelude, like Delton et al. (2011a) but154
unlike Ze↵erman (2014), we focus on proximate psychology. Accordingly, we consider155
a question ubiquitous in error management theory, the question of whether evolution156
leads to adaptive cognitive biases. In addition, like Ze↵erman (2014) but unlike Delton157
et al. (2011a), we find that intuitive and compelling modifications of the error manage-158
ment model dramatically reduce cost asymmetries and limit the evolution of one-shot159
reciprocity as a consequence.160
2 Uncertainty and the cost asymmetry161
Agents are randomly paired to play a simultaneous prisoner’s dilemma with two possible162
actions. Cooperating brings a private cost, c > 0, and generates a benefit, b > c, for163
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the other player. Defecting does not bring a cost or generate a benefit. Interactions can164
be repeated or one-shot, which we indicate with the variable R. R is a random variable165
with support {0, 1}. This simply means that R takes each of the two values in the set166
{0, 1} with some probability. Once R takes a specific value from the support, we refer167
to the realization of R, which we denote generically as r.168
R = 0 indicates a one-shot interaction, and thus R = 0 means the agents in a pair play169
a typical one-shot prisoner’s dilemma. Defection is always better from the individual’s170
perspective, but mutual cooperation is better for both agents than mutual defection.171
R = 1 indicates repeated interactions, which occurs with an ex ante probability of172
P (R = 1) 2 (0, 1). If R = 1, the continuation probability is ! 2 (0, 1), and thus the173
expected number of interactions is k = 1/(1   !) > 1. R = 1 is a standard repeated174
prisoner’s dilemma in dyads (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981). As ! increases, the expected175
number of repeated interactions increases, and this can increase the gains from mutual176
cooperation when reciprocators are paired.177
Before paired agents play, each receives a private signal providing information about178
whether the game will be one-shot or repeated. For individual i, this signal is a random179
variable, Si, with the real numbers as a support and realizations si. Importantly, a180
realized signal leaves an agent with some degree of uncertainty. How agents respond181
to this posterior uncertainty is a key question of interest. The cumulative distribution182
functions for signals are denoted F (si |R = r). Private signals are informative but noisy.183
Specifically, in keeping with the error management model (Delton et al., 2011a), we184
assume that the F (· |R = r) are continuous and strictly monotonic, and for all finite si185
they satisfy F (si |R = 0) > F (si |R = 1). The latter condition ensures that relatively186
small values of si provide relatively strong evidence that a pair will have a one-shot187
interaction, while relatively large values of si provide relatively strong evidence that a188
pair will have a relationship with k > 1 expected interactions.189
After receiving a signal, an agent commits to one of two options, either always defect190
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(D) or tit-for-tat (T). We call these options “sub-game strategies” because they refer to191
the strategies available after an agent receives a private signal and reaches the associated192
sub-game. The set of sub-game strategies is thus {D,T}. To denote sub-game strategies193
for i, Xi is a random variable with support {D,T} and realizations xi.194
When ! is close to one, a relationship in a dyad is long-lasting in the sense that ex195
ante the expected number of interactions is large. In this case a radical cost asymmetry196
results. Specifically, if interactions are repeated and i commits to defection when paired197
with a partner playing tit-for-tat, i will receive b in lieu of k(b  c). This error involves a198
cost of k(b c) b, which becomes arbitrarily large as ! ! 1 . If, however, the interaction199
is one-shot and i commits to tit-for-tat when paired with a partner playing unconditional200
defection, i will receive  b instead of 0. This error involves a cost of 0   ( b), which201
is constant. By extension, the asymmetry in expected error costs becomes arbitrarily202
large as the length of relationships increases when interactions are repeated. Intuitively,203
defecting on someone you will interact with over and over again can be boundlessly204
costly, while cooperating with someone you will never see again cannot.205
3 Degrees of freedom under error management206
We begin by examining the flexibility of decision making under the error management207
model. In doing so, we focus on the psychological basis of behavior because the er-208
ror management model specifies the psychology of decision making in a way that has209
potential implications for evolution. An analysis of population dynamics comes later.210
Selection in the error management model is based on fitness values that depend on211
phenotypes. In general, if an error management model has many degrees of freedom,212
it will admit di↵erent psychological pathways for producing a given phenotype (McKay213
and E↵erson, 2010). This implies, in turn, the possibility that a selected phenotype can214
be produced in many di↵erent ways. In such cases, selection on psychology will not be215
well defined, and random drift will play an outsize role in the evolution of cognition. As216
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we now explain, the error management model of one-shot reciprocity exhibits this kind217
of excess flexibility.218
Specifically, each agent processes information, which leads to some belief about219
whether a relationship will involve repeated interactions, and given a belief each agent220
has some motivation to choose tit-for-tat. The flexibility of the error management model221
stems from the fact that a single phenotype is often consistent with multiple combina-222
tions of information processing and motivation. Consequently, even if selection favors a223
unique phenotype, it may not favor a unique form of cognition. In practice, however, the224
error management model of one-shot reciprocity imposes restrictions that eliminate this225
possibility. The result is two di↵erent versions of the model that represent two di↵erent226
views of how cognition can evolve.227
To see this, let agent i have a signal threshold, Ei. If a signal is below or equal to the228
threshold (si  Ei), the agent plays tit-for-tat with probability ↵i 2 [0, 1] and always229
defect with probability 1   ↵i. If the signal is above the signal threshold (si > Ei),230
the agent plays tit-for-tat with probability  i 2 [0, 1] and always defect with probability231
1  i. Altogether, the quantities Ei, ↵i, and  i specify the psychology of decision making232
under the error management model. Ei represents information processing, while ↵i and233
 i represent the agent’s motivation to play tit-for-tat given a processed signal.234
The phenotype of an agent comprises both the probability of playing tit-for-tat if235
an interaction is one-shot (i.e. P (Xi = T |R = 0)) and the probability of playing tit-236
for-tat if interactions are repeated (i.e. P (Xi = T |R = 1)). Many phenotypes available237
under the error management are consistent with multiple combinations of ↵i,  i, and Ei.238
Consider, for example, any phenotype that plays tit-for-tat with a constant probability239
regardless of whether or not interactions are repeated. If ↵i =  i, such a phenotype240
results, and the signal threshold in these cases can take any value whatsoever. Because241
the signal threshold can take any value, the error management model can generate the242
phenotype in question in an infinite number of ways. Phenotypes that always choose243
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T with the same probability are important because they include classic strategies as244
special cases. Specifically, ↵i =  i = 0 means the agent always defects, and ↵i =  i = 1245
means the agent always chooses tit-for-tat. Moreover, we show (Fig. 2 and electronic246
supplementary material, § 2.3) that one or both of these strategies can be evolutionarily247
stable when the error management model is restricted to reduce the importance of drift.248
For present purposes, the important point is that any phenotype given by ↵i =  i can249
be produced in an infinite number of ways.250
Apart from phenotypes given by ↵i =  i, other phenotypes might also be consistent251
with multiple underlying psychologies. The details depend on both the phenotype being252
considered and the probability distributions for private signals (electronic supplementary253
material, § 1). In Fig. 1A, we show an example of the important case involving normally254
distributed signals (e.g. Delton et al., 2011a). As Fig. 1A shows, the space of phenotypes255
allowed by the error management model is a strict subset of all possible phenotypes, and256
we show a sample of curves within this subset. Importantly, we show only a sample of257
curves because doing so clearly reveals that the curves routinely overlap and intersect258
each other. Where two or more curves overlap or intersect, multiple selectively neutral259
psychologies (i.e. combinations of ↵i,  i, and Ei) can generate the phenotypes in question.260
Consequently, in terms of cognition, drift can be an extremely important evolutionary261
force. We suspect that the error management model, for this reason, eliminates excess262
flexibility by providing additional structure in two di↵erent ways.263
Specifically, one can fix Ei exogenously for all agents and allow the distribution of264
↵i and  i values to evolve (Delton et al., 2011a, Model 1). This restriction ensures that265
the model can generate a given phenotype in only one way (electronic supplementary266
material, § 1), and drift will be less important than in the full three-dimensional model.267
The (↵i, i) cognitive architecture allows for strategies that seem especially suggestive268
of a cognitive bias. The reason is because positive ↵i values mean that agents play269
tit-for-tat given a “one-shot belief” (Delton et al., 2011a, p. 13337), which intuitively270
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suggests some kind of distortion in the way agents process and respond to information.271
We will see momentarily if this intuition is correct.272
Alternatively, one can set ↵i = 0 and  i = 1 for all agents, and allow the distribution273
of Ei values to evolve (Delton et al., 2011a, Model 2). This restriction also ensures that274
the model can generate a given phenotype in only one way (electronic supplementary275
material, § 1). Fig. 1B shows how these two restrictions a↵ect the space of admissible276
phenotypes.277
Having two versions of the error management model solves a potential problem. By278
focusing separately on the evolution of either motivation in the (↵i, i) model or infor-279
mation processing in the signal threshold (Ei) model, one can reduce the importance of280
drift. Crucially, however, the two versions of the error management model are e↵ectively281
redundant in an important sense. Evolution under the (↵i, i) architecture leads to three282
possible outcomes at the population level (Fig. 2 and electronic supplementary material,283
§ 2.3 and § 2.5). Selection leads to either (i) ↵ = 0 and   = 0, (ii) ↵ = 0 and   = 1,284
or (iii) ↵ = 1 and   = 1. These three steady states are all available under the signal285
threshold model provided one allows for limiting phenotypes as signal thresholds become286
infinitely large or small. Although the (↵i, i) architecture allows for phenotypes that287
the signal threshold architecture cannot produce in general (Fig. 1B), the phenotypes288
unique to the (↵i, i) architecture do not seem to arise under selection. In terms of289
evolutionary outcomes, the (↵i, i) architecture thus adds little if anything to a simpler290
cognitive architecture based only on signal thresholds.291
In spite of this redundancy, our first task is to see if the error management model292
supports the evolution of cognitive biases, and to do so we must check both versions of293
the model. Accordingly, in the next section we provide rational benchmarks for both294
the (↵i, i) architecture and the signal threshold architecture.295
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4 Does error management support a cognitive bias?296
To provide rational benchmarks, we work with both versions of the error management297
model. In each case, we identify the Bayesian Nash equilibria of the game in terms of298
the appropriate cognitive architecture (electronic supplementary material, § 2). For the299
first cognitive architecture, the signal threshold is exogenously fixed, and strategies are300
defined in terms of ↵i and  i values. For the second cognitive architecture, ↵i and  i301
values are exogenously fixed, and strategies are defined in terms of the signal threshold.302
For comparison, we use evolutionary game theory to find equilibrium strategies for the303
associated error management models. First, we fix the signal threshold and let the304
distribution over ↵i and  i values evolve (Delton et al., 2011a, Model 1). Second, we fix305
↵i and  i and let the distribution of signal threshold values evolve (Delton et al., 2011a,306
Model 2).307
For both types of cognitive architecture, we show analytically that the evolutionary308
stable strategies for the error management model (electronic supplementary material,309
§ 2.3 and § 2.4) match symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria (electronic supplementary310
material, § 2.1 and § 2.2). To provide more general results, we also used agent-based311
simulations to simulate evolutionary dynamics for the error management models under312
both cognitive architectures (electronic supplementary material, § 2.5). Unlike an anal-313
ysis of evolutionary stable strategies, this approach allows for arbitrary distributions314
of strategies in the population. Fig. 2 compares the error management model and the315
rational benchmark under the (↵i, i) architecture for a wide range of parameter val-316
ues. Fig. 3 shows the analogous comparison under the signal threshold architecture. In317
both cases the correspondence is striking. The typical outcome is equivalence between318
error management agents and unbiased optimizers. When agents face uncertainty about319
whether a new relationship will involve a one-shot interaction or repeated interactions,320
error management and a rational benchmark are e↵ectively the same.321
These results demonstrate that evolutionary stable strategies are a refinement of Nash322
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equilibria (Weibull, 1995; Samuelson, 1998). The more important message relates to one-323
shot reciprocity specifically and error management theory more broadly. Simply put, we324
have no reason to conclude that the error management model supports a domain-specific325
bias in how agents process and respond to signals related to reputation and repeated326
interactions. We can just as well say that the model supports one-shot reciprocity via327
run-of-the-mill optimization given Bayesian beliefs. Discriminating between these two328
generic possibilities remains one of the principal challenges of error management theory329
(McKay and E↵erson, 2010; Marshall et al., 2013).330
5 Is one-shot reciprocity robust?331
In this section, we examine the extent to which the evolution of one-shot reciprocity332
is robust to a simple and intuitive modification of the error management model. We333
restrict attention to the signal threshold model. We do so because, as discussed above,334
the two versions of the error management model are e↵ectively redundant in the sense335
that the (↵i, i) architecture always leads to the evolution of phenotypes available under336
the signal threshold architecture.337
The evolution of one-shot reciprocity under error management involves two key re-338
strictions (Delton et al., 2011a). First, as a sub-game strategy, each agent chooses either339
unconditional defection or tit-for-tat. Second, each agent has some sensitivity to private340
signals, a sensitivity summarized by Ei, that commits the agent fully to a sub-game341
strategy before the agent’s first interaction with her partner.342
Ze↵erman (2014) relaxed the first restriction but maintained the second. In his343
model, each agent must fully commit before the initial interaction with a partner, but344
the set of sub-game strategies includes options that allow agents to repent for their past345
defections, to forgive the past defections of others, and to hesitate before cooperating346
for the first time. With these modifications to the set of sub-game strategies, one-shot347
reciprocity does not evolve reliably (Ze↵erman, 2014).348
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We maintain the first restriction and relax the second. Specifically, we maintain349
always defecting and tit-for-tat as the only two sub-game strategies. However, if an350
agent reaches the second interaction with a specific partner, all uncertainty is removed.351
The agent at this point knows with certainty that interactions are repeated. We thus352
introduce a responsive strategy that allows the agent to update her sub-game strategy1 at353
this point in time. This is the only change we introduce relative to the error management354
model of one-shot reciprocity.355
Specifically, let Gi (electronic supplementary material, § 3) indicate whether i is un-356
responsive (U) or responsive (R). If Gi = U, i is unresponsive. If i’s realized signal is357
above her threshold, i plays tit-for-tat. Otherwise, i defects unconditionally. Unrespon-358
sive types do not update their sub-game strategies if they reach the second interaction359
with a partner. In particular, this means unresponsive agents can be locked into always360
defecting even when they are certain interactions are repeated. If Gi = R, in contrast,361
i is responsive. Responsive types are like unresponsive types for the first interaction.362
If, however, a responsive agent reaches a second interaction with a given partner, she363
responds to the fact that she no longer faces uncertainty about whether interactions are364
repeated and plays tit-for-tat.365
Importantly, one can in some cases translate between our approach and an approach366
that modifies the set of sub-game strategies (e.g. Ze↵erman, 2014). For example, when367
paired with certain types of partner, a responsive agent is behaviorally equivalent to an368
agent who pre-commits fully before play, who chooses tit-for-two-tats for a signal above369
her threshold, and who chooses hesitant tit-for-tat otherwise. Our model compares370
this type of agent to the original error management agents (i.e. Delton et al., 2011a).371
Although Ze↵erman (2014) analyzed two models involving hesitant tit-for-tat or tit-for-372
two-tats, he did not analyze the particular combination we consider. Our model, in373
e↵ect, represents the minimum conceivable change to the error management model.374
1We retain the term sub-game strategy to refer to strategies from the set {D,T}, but we now addi-
tionally use the term to refer to the sub-game reached after a single interaction with a given partner.
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In addition, in a reply to McNally and Tanner (2011), Delton et al. (2011b) argue375
that hesitant strategies are largely irrelevant for understanding one-shot reciprocity. Our376
comparison with Ze↵erman (2014), however, shows that hesitant strategies are a nat-377
ural result of allowing error management agents to respond to all relevant information378
about the duration of a social relationship. Responsive error managers respond to the379
uncertainty that obtains after observing private signals, as in the original error manage-380
ment model. They additionally respond to the certainty that obtains when they reach a381
second interaction with someone. Accepting the first response but rejecting the second382
is tantamount to positing an error manager who is sensitive to cues of observability but383
cannot look a partner in the face and recognize that they have interacted previously.384
Accepting both responses, however, e↵ectively means accepting hesitant strategies. For385
this reason, in spite of claims to the contrary, hesitant strategies are a natural outgrowth386
of error management.387
We present an analysis of unresponsive and responsive types in the electronic sup-388
plementary material (§ 3). The key result shows that unresponsive types should be389
extremely vulnerable to invasion by responsive types in precisely those cases that mat-390
ter most. Specifically, if we exclude responsive types from consideration, long-lasting391
relationships under repeated interactions, as implied by large values of !, lead to the392
evolution of low values of Ei. Low values of Ei allow agents to avoid the especially costly393
error of defecting when paired with a reciprocating partner for many interactions. This394
is the basic error management result (electronic supplementary material, § 3.1). In a395
population of unresponsive types, however, a mutant responsive type has strictly higher396
expected fitness (electronic supplementary material, § 3.2) than the resident unrespon-397
sive type if and only if (!b c)(1 F (Ei |R = 1))/(1 !2) > c. This condition is satisfied398
if the continuation probability, !, is su ciently large and the signal threshold, Ei, is suf-399
ficiently small. In e↵ect, large values of ! have two countervailing e↵ects. They support400
the evolution of one-shot reciprocity by unresponsive agents when responsive types are401
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excluded. They also, however, render a population of unresponsive types increasingly402
vulnerable to invasion when responsive types are allowed.403
For more general results, we used agent-based simulations to simulate evolutionary404
dynamics in a model that allows for unresponsive agents, responsive agents, and agents405
who always defect without conditioning on their private signals (electronic supplemen-406
tary material, § 3.3). Our simulations show that, even for relationships that last a long407
time under repeated interactions, one-shot reciprocity is rarely observed. In particular,408
for a wide range of parameter combinations favoring cooperation, responsive agents dis-409
place both unresponsive agents and unconditional defectors (e.g. Fig. 4A). Moreover,410
signal thresholds for responsive types evolve to relatively high values (e.g. Fig. 4B),411
which ensures that agents rarely cooperate on the first interaction. Altogether, the com-412
bination of responsiveness and high signal thresholds means that agents can enjoy the413
mutual gains of prolonged cooperation once they know they face repeated interactions.414
Doing so, however, does not require agents to run a significant risk of exploitation in415
one-shot interactions. The error management model, in contrast, forces agents to risk416
one-shot exploitation in order to enjoy the gains of long-run cooperation. This is what417
drives the evolution of one-shot reciprocity, but the result does not persist when agents418
can respond to both the uncertainty that always holds before play and to the certainty419
that sometimes arises during play.420
6 Discussion and conclusion421
Our results suggest potential challenges for the error management model of one-shot reci-422
procity and for error management theory in general. With respect to error management423
theory in general, we have demonstrated that asymmetric costs lead to the evolution424
of behavioral biases perfectly consistent with unbiased optimization. Accordingly, one425
cannot o↵er biases in behavior, biases like men stubbornly approaching women for sex426
or reciprocators risking one-shot exploitation, as evidence for adaptive domain-specific427
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cognitive biases.428
McKay and E↵erson (2010) have o↵ered cognitive constraints as one possible route429
to the evolution of genuine error management biases. Our results clarify what this430
mechanism would require. In Fig. 5, we have translated evolutionary outcomes from431
both versions of the error management model (Figs. 2 and Fig. 3) into phenotype space.432
Fig. 5 shows that the two versions of the model do not always lead to the evolution of433
identical phenotypes. As explained above, the (↵i, i) model always leads the evolution of434
phenotypes available to the signal treshold model (Fig. 2), but the opposite is not always435
true. When comparing evolutionary outcomes, disparities between the two models are436
typically small, but they can occur precisely because the two cognitive architectures437
allow for di↵erent phenotypic possibilities (Fig. 1B).438
One could potentially describe such disparities as situations in which constraints lead439
to bias. To do so, however, we must choose one architecture and the associated set of440
possible phenotypes as a reference. We judge “bias” relative to the benchmarks for this441
reference. We must then, however, force evolution to take place under the other archi-442
tecture. If evolution under the latter architecture cannot lead to a benchmark outcome443
under the reference architecture, we can invoke the notion of constraints producing bias.444
Why, though, would we pick one architecture as a reference, only to require that selection445
and evolution take place under a di↵erent architecture? As we have shown, restricting446
attention to one architecture at a time means that evolution leads to outcomes consistent447
with a rational benchmark.448
If cognition is su ciently flexible, pinning down the notion of an adaptive cognitive449
bias can be challenging for other reasons. If selection favors a phenotype consistent with450
multiple psychologies, what then is an adaptive cognitive bias? Imagine, for example,451
that ancestral men looking for sex received signals from women and processed the as-452
sociated information to infer the interest these women had in sex. In addition, given a453
processed signal, ancestral men had some motivation for sex. Missed mating opportuni-454
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ties were costly, but rejections were not. Consequently, unless a woman signaled extreme455
distaste, approaching women was usually the best choice.456
How can selection produce a bias in favor of men approaching women for sex? In457
general, many options might be possible. A man could process information to over-458
infer a woman’s interest while having a relatively weak motivation for sex that exactly459
o↵sets his biased inferences in the optimal way. Just as good, however, might be a460
man who under-infers a woman’s interest while having a strong motivation for sex that461
compensates optimally. Finally, and perhaps once again just as good, a man could462
make unbiased inferences, implying posterior beliefs equivalent to a Bayesian, and given463
these beliefs he has an optimal motivation for sex. If a situation like this obtains, a464
specific phenotype is optimal, and an array of psychologies can generate the phenotype465
in question. Some forms of adaptive cognition may indeed be biased. A specific bias,466
however, would be neither more nor less adaptive than any other cognition, biased or467
otherwise, that produces the same phenotype. We do not know how plausible this468
example might be, but we would like to propose that high-dimensional cognition will469
often allow multiple routes to a given phenotype.470
Apart from potential implications for error management theory, our results demon-471
strate the theoretical fragility of one-shot reciprocity. Several experiments have demon-472
strated that payo↵-irrelevant face-like stimuli can increase altruism in anonymous one-473
shot settings (Nettle et al., 2013; Sparks and Barclay, 2013). This finding places us in474
the middle of an interpretive puzzle. The stimuli in question do not a↵ect payo↵s, and475
the stimuli suggest, in a quite specific way, scrutiny by others. For these reasons, a476
compelling interpretation of experimental results is to posit a domain-specific cognitive477
bias based on repeated interactions, reciprocity, and reputation management. In light478
of recent modeling e↵orts, we have no obvious articulation of what this means.479
In behavioral terms, uncertainty about the duration of a social relationship can lead480
to the evolution of altruism in one-shot interactions in order to avoid the large oppor-481
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tunity costs associated with treating repeated interactions as one-shot (Delton et al.,482
2011a). Our results, however, in conjunction with those of Ze↵erman (2014), show that483
key restrictions have to be in place for this kind of evolutionary process to work. Ze↵er-484
man (2014) shows that the set of sub-game strategies has to be appropriately restricted.485
We show that the agent’s ability to respond to new information has to be appropriately486
restricted. Relax either restriction, and one-shot reciprocity under error management487
does not reliably evolve. Moreover, we show that, even if the necessary restrictions488
hold, the evolution of one-shot reciprocity is perfectly consistent with unbiased opti-489
mization. Consequently, observing one-shot reciprocity provides an argument neither490
for nor against a cognitive bias.491
This leaves at least three possibilities for making sense of experimental results on one-492
shot reciprocity. One possibility is that one-shot reciprocity evolved under uncertainty493
and asymmetric error costs in the ancestral past. In the ancestral past, the behavior494
that evolved was perfectly consistent with unbiased optimization, but the cognition in-495
volved was domain-specific. In a contemporary one-shot experiment with a face in the496
background (e.g. Haley and Fessler, 2005), observed altruism is due to this vestigial,497
domain-specific psychology. In particular, observed altruism in the present is not con-498
sistent with unbiased optimization because the ancestral cognition prevents an optimal499
response to the explicit material incentives in a contemporary one-shot experiment. A500
second possibility is that the relevant cognition was and is unbiased, and subjects who see501
payo↵-irrelevant faces in contemporary experiments actually update their beliefs about502
whether the game is one-shot. This explanation would be bad news for experimentalists503
because it would suggest that subjects routinely discredit the explicit incentive structure504
stipulated in an experiment. Finally, in light of the recent replication crisis in experi-505
mental social science (Open-Science-Collaboration, 2015), a third possibility may simply506
be that one-shot reciprocity is not a robust experimental result.507
In any case, whatever one’s favorite interpretation of empirical studies, uncertainty508
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and asymmetric error costs only lead in theory to the evolution of one-shot reciprocity509
under extreme restrictions. One has to assume that people are astonishingly narrow510
when dealing with new interaction partners. Specifically, they consider very few options511
when initially deciding how to play. They also do not update how they play as they512
acquire new information, and they know they will not update how they play as they513
acquire new information. These are strong assumptions, but relaxing one or more of514
them attenuates expected cost asymmetries dramatically. If a person sees su cient515
scope for recuperating from an initial defection once she knows a relationship will last,516
one-shot reciprocity does not pay.517
Critically, we would like to emphasize the following. We are not arguing that proso-518
cial behavior in one-shot interactions is completely unrelated to reciprocity. We are also519
not arguing that cues of observability in a one-shot experiment (e.g. Haley and Fessler,520
2005) have nothing to do with reputational concerns. The number of studies showing521
e↵ects from payo↵-irrelevant faces suggests that, for the moment at least, one-shot reci-522
procity remains a viable hypothesis. We are, however, arguing that uncertainty and523
associated asymmetric error costs do not provide a robust theoretical basis for the evo-524
lution of a cognitive bias that supports one-shot reciprocity. When the behavior evolves,525
it is unbiased. With a minimum degree of realism, the behavior does not evolve.526
This brings us to our interpretive puzzle. Aside from error management, we have527
other explanations for one-shot altruism (e.g. Richerson et al., 2015). Whatever the528
role these other mechanisms may or may not play, none of them to our knowledge529
imply that a person should become more altruistic because a stylized face of no material530
consequence suddenly appears without explanation in one’s surroundings. In spite of531
several studies showing such an e↵ect, the only candidate explanation for this finding,532
namely the error management model of one-shot reciprocity, also does not imply this533
behavioral regularity. This is the paradox arising from the unbiased fragility of one-shot534
reciprocity.535
21
7 Acknowledgements536
We would like to thank two anonymous referees for several helpful comments on an537
earlier draft of the paper.538
References539
Axelrod, R. and Hamilton, W. D. (1981). The evolution of cooperation. Science, 211(27540
March), 1390–1396.541
Boyd, R. (2006). Reciprocity: you have to think di↵erent. Journal of Evolutionary542
Biology , 19(5), 1380–1382.543
Boyd, R. and Lorberbaum, J. P. (1987). No pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in the544
repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. Nature, 327, 58–59.545
Burnham, T. C. (2013). Toward a neo-darwinian synthesis of neoclassical and behavioral546
economics. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 90, Supplement(0), S113547
– S127. Evolution as a General Theoretical Framework for Economics and Public548
Policy.549
Camerer, C. F. (2003). Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction.550
Princeton: Princeton University Press.551
Camerer, C. F., Dreber, A., Forsell, E., Ho, T.-H., Huber, J., Johannesson, M., Kirchler,552
M., Almenberg, J., Altmejd, A., Chan, T., Heikensten, E., Holzmeister, F., Imai,553
T., Isaksson, S., Nave, G., Pfei↵er, T., Razen, M., and Wu, H. (2016). Evaluating554
replicability of laboratory experiments in economics. Science.555
Delton, A. W., Krasnow, M. M., Cosmides, L., and Tooby, J. (2011a). Evolution of direct556
reciprocity under uncertainty can explain human generosity in one-shot encounters.557
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108(32), 13335–13340.558
22
Delton, A. W., Krasnow, M. M., Cosmides, L., and Tooby, J. (2011b). Reply to mc-559
nally and tanner: Generosity evolves when cooperative decisions must be made under560
uncertainty. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108(44), E972.561
Fehr, E. and Schneider, F. (2010). Eyes are on us, but nobody cares: are eye cues562
relevant for strong reciprocity? Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences ,563
277(1686), 1315–1323.564
Hagen, E. H. and Hammerstein, P. (2006). Game theory and human evolution: A565
critique of some recent interpretations of experimental games. Theoretical Population566
Biology , 69(3), 339 – 348.567
Haley, K. J. and Fessler, D. M. T. (2005). Nobody’s watching?: subtle cues a↵ect568
generosity in an anonymous economic game. Evolution and Human Behavior , 26(3),569
245–256.570
Haselton, M. G. and Buss, D. M. (2000). Error management theory: a new perspective571
on biases in cross-sex mind reading. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology ,572
78(1), 81–91.573
Haselton, M. G. and Nettle, D. (2006). The paranoid optimist: an integrative evolu-574
tionary model of cognitive biases. Personality and Social Psychology Review , 10(1),575
47–66.576
Henrich, J. (2004). Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale577
cooperation. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 53(1), 3–35.578
Johnson, D. D., Blumstein, D. T., Fowler, J. H., and Haselton, M. G. (2013). The579
evolution of error: error management, cognitive constraints, and adaptive decision-580
making biases. Trends in Ecology & Evolution, 28(8), 474 – 481.581
Le, S. and Boyd, R. (2007). Evolutionary dynamics of the continuous iterated prisoner’s582
dilemma. Journal of Theoretical Biology , 245(2), 258 – 267.583
23
Marshall, J. A., Trimmer, P. C., Houston, A. I., and McNamara, J. M. (2013). On584
evolutionary explanations of cognitive biases. Trends in Ecology & Evolution, 28(8),585
469 – 473.586
McKay, R. and E↵erson, C. (2010). The subtleties of error management. Evolution and587
Human Behavior , 31(5), 309 – 319.588
McNally, L. and Tanner, C. J. (2011). Flexible strategies, forgiveness, and the evolution589
of generosity in one-shot encounters. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,590
108(44), E971.591
Nettle, D., Harper, Z., Kidson, A., Stone, R., Penton-Voak, I. S., and Bateson, M.592
(2013). The watching eyes e↵ect in the Dictator Game: it’s not how much you give,593
it’s being seen to give something. Evolution and Human Behavior , 34(1), 35–40.594
Open-Science-Collaboration (2015). Estimating the reproducibility of psychological sci-595
ence. Science, 349(6251).596
Perriloux, C. and Kurzban, R. (2015). Do Men Overperceive Women’s Sexual Interest?597
Psychological Science, 26(1), 70–77.598
Raihani, N. J. and Bshary, R. (2015). Why humans might help strangers. Frontiers in599
Behavioral Neuroscience, 9(39).600
Richerson, P. J., Baldini, R., Bell, A., Demps, K., Frost, K., Hillis, V., Mathew, S.,601
Newton, E., Narr, N., Newson, L., Ross, C., Smaldino, P., Waring, T., and Ze↵er-602
man, M. (2015). Cultural group selection plays an essential role in explaining human603
cooperation: a sketch of the evidence. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, In press .604
Rigdon, M., Ishii, K., Watabe, M., and Kitayama, S. (2009). Minimal social cues in the605
dictator game. Journal of Economic Psychology , 30(3), 358–367.606
24
Samuelson, L. (1998). Evolutionary games and equilibrium selection, volume 1. MIT607
Press.608
Shanks, D. R., Newell, B. R., Lee, E. H., Balakrishnan, D., Ekelund, L., Cenac, Z.,609
Kavvadia, F., and Moore, C. (2013). Priming intelligent behavior: An elusive phe-610
nomenon. PLoS ONE , 8(4), 1–10.611
Sparks, A. and Barclay, P. (2013). Eye images increase generosity, but not for long: the612
limited e↵ect of a false cue. Evolution and Human Behavior , 34(5), 317–322.613
van Veelen, M., Garc´ıa, J., Rand, D. G., and Nowak, M. A. (2012). Direct reciprocity614
in structured populations. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences , 109(25),615
9929–9934.616
Vogt, S., E↵erson, C., Berger, J., and Fehr, E. (2015). Eye spots do not increase altruism617
in children. Evolution and Human Behavior , 36(3), 224 – 231.618
Wahl, L. M. and Nowak, M. A. (1999). The continuous prisoner’s dilemma: II. linear619
reactive strategies with noise. Journal of Theoretical Biology , 200(3), 323 – 338.620
Weibull, J. W. (1995). Evolutionary Game Theory . Cambridge: The MIT Press.621
Ze↵erman, M. R. (2014). Direct reciprocity under uncertainty does not explain one-622
shot cooperation, but demonstrates the benefits of a norm psychology. Evolution and623
Human Behavior , 35(5), 358 – 367.624
25
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Probability tit-for-tat if one-shot
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
tit
-fo
r-
ta
t i
f r
ep
ea
te
d
A
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Probability tit-for-tat if one-shot
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
tit
-fo
r-
ta
t i
f r
ep
ea
te
d
B
Figure 1: Possible phenotypes under di↵erent cognitive architectures. A phenotype
consists of two probabilities, the probability of choosing tit-for-tat when an interaction is one-shot
(P (Xi = T |R = 0)) and the probability of choosing tit-for-tat when interactions are repeated
(P (Xi = T |R = 1)). To generate this figure, signals were normally distributed (e.g. Delton et al.,
2011a) with means at -1 (R = 0) and 1 (R = 1) and standard deviations of 1. Panel A shows
a small selection of curves from the set of possible phenotypes for the full three-dimensional
error management model. We generated the curves by fixing values for ↵i and  i, which are
the motivations to choose T for low signals and high signals respectively, and then letting the
signal threshold vary continuously. Pure blue means that ↵i = 0 and  i = 1, while pure red
means that ↵i = 1 and  i = 0. Intermediate colors reflect intermediate values of ↵i and  i.
The overlapping and intersecting curves in A show that, for many phenotypes, the full error
management model can produce the phenotype in question via multiple combinations of ↵i,  i,
and the signal threshold. Panel B shows what happens when restrictions are put in place to
eliminate this flexibility and by extension the importance of drift. The polygon shows the set of
possible phenotypes for the (↵i, i) architecture when the signal threshold is fixed at 0. The blue
line shows the set of possible phenotypes for the signal treshold architecture (↵i = 0, i = 1).
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Figure 2: Equivalence between a rational benchmark and the evolution of an error
management psychology under the (↵i, i) architecture. Each cell shows the space of
↵i and  i values, where ↵i represents the motivation to play tit-for-tat when a private signal
suggests a one-shot interaction, and  i represents the motivation to play tit-for-tat when a private
signal suggests repeated interactions. The cells di↵er by values of k = 1/(1   !), which is the
expected number of interactions when interactions are repeated, and b/c, which is the benefit-
to-cost ratio in the prisoner’s dilemma. Red circles show Bayesian Nash equilibria, which serve
as unbiased rational benchmarks. Gray-scale histograms show the steady-state distributions of
strategies from evolutionary simulations of the error management model. The overlap between
the rational benchmarks and the error management model shows we cannot conclude that error
management supports the evolution of a domain-specific cognitive bias associated with one-shot
reciprocity.
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Figure 3: Equivalence between a rational benchmark and the evolution of an error
management psychology under the signal threshold architecture. Signal thresholds
separate the space of signals into two parts. If an agent receives a signal at or below the threshold,
the agent plays always defect. If an agent receives a signal above the threshold, the agent plays
tit-for-tat. We specified signal distributions so that an agent with a signal threshold at zero
plays always defect and tit-for-tat with equal probabilities (electronic supplementary material,
§ 3.3.1). Each cell shows a histogram indicating the distribution of strategies after simulating
evolution under the error management model. Red triangles show Bayesian Nash equilibria,
which serve as unbiased rational benchmarks. The cells di↵er by values of k = 1/(1  !), which
is the expected number of interactions when interactions are repeated, and b/c, which is the
benefit-to-cost ratio in the prisoner’s dilemma. The overlap between the rational benchmarks
and the error management model shows we cannot conclude that error management supports the
evolution of a domain-specific cognitive bias associated with one-shot reciprocity. The lower left
cell has only one equilibrium in which agents always defect, which is analogous to an infinitely
large threshold. The associated histogram shows the distribution of signal threshold values after
25,000 generations of directional selection.
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Figure 4: The fragility of one-shot reciprocity. The evolution of one-shot reciprocity
hinges on the restriction that agents are unresponsive, which means they must commit fully to
always defecting or tit-for-tat before an initial interaction with a new partner. Here we introduce
responsive types. Responsive agents can update their choice to tit-for-tat once they reach a
second interaction with a partner and thus know interactions are repeated. Panel A shows the
simulated evolution of strategies with a uniform initial mix of responsive types, unresponsive
types, and unconditional defectors. Responsive types quickly become the most common type.
Panel B shows the associated evolution of the average signal threshold in the population with
95% bootstrapped confidence intervals. Higher values imply that one-shot reciprocity is rare.
Signal thresholds become increasingly large as responsive types take over, which means that
one-shot reciprocity almost never occurs. For this example, the expected number of interactions
under repeated interactions is k = 20, while the benefit-to-cost ratio is b/c = 2. The ex ante
probability of repeated interaction is P (R = 1) = 0.5. Additional details and further analyses
are available in the electronic supplementary material (Figure S4 and § 3).
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Figure 5: A cognitive bias requires one cognitive architecture for reference and
another cognitive architecture for evolution. The figure shows results from Fig. 2 and Fig. 3
in phenotype space. A phenotype consists of two probabilities, the probability of choosing tit-for-
tat when an interaction is one-shot (P (Xi = T |R = 0)) and the probability of choosing tit-for-tat
when interactions are repeated (P (Xi = T |R = 1)). Panel A shows the (↵i, i) architecture
(Fig. 2), and B shows the signal threshold architecture (Fig. 3). The cells di↵er by values of
k = 1/(1   !), which is the expected number of interactions when interactions are repeated,
and b/c, which is the benefit-to-cost ratio in the prisoner’s dilemma. Red circles show Bayesian
Nash equilibria, which serve as unbiased rational benchmarks given an architecture. Gray-
scale histograms show the steady-state distributions from evolutionary simulations of the error
management models. Because the two architectures do not allow for the same possible phenotypes
(Fig. 1B), the rational benchmarks and evolutionary outcomes are not always identical in both
cases, e.g. the lower right cells of A and B. Inferring a bias based on such disparities requires us
to choose one architecture as a reference while assuming that evolution occurs with respect to
the other architecture.
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